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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed in 1990
with the stated goal of providing a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."1 Congress determined that, at the time of the passage of
the Act, approximately forty-three million Americans had mental or
physical disabilities. 2 By enacting the ADA, Congress meant to
"provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 3 Now, fourteen
years after the ADA's enactment, the success of these goals is in
doubt. A 1998 survey of cases brought under Title I of the ADA4
indicated that employers prevail in approximately 92 percent of the
final case decisions. 5 The survey also indicated that employers prevail
in 86 percent of the administrative complaints resolved by the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission. 6 One explanation for these
pro-defendant results may be that courts encounter an abundance of
meritless claims, and thus these results are justified. On the other
hand, it could be that courts and jurors harbor stereotypes about
disabled plaintiffs that influence their decisions. 7 An alternative
possibility is that the ADA sets forth an analytical framework that
makes it very difficult for plaintiffs with certain disabilities to prevail.
Thus, many plaintiffs with meritorious claims may lose their ADA
cases not because of incorrect stereotypes by judges and jurors, but
rather, because of the language of the ADA itself.
The ADA differs from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
other antidiscrimination laws in that Congress defined what it means
1.
2.
3.
4.
THE

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
§ 12101(a)(1).
§ 12101(b)(2).
Title I of the ADA covers discrimination in employment. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
AMERICANS

WITH

DISABILITIES

ACT:

A PRACTICAL

AND

LEGAL

GUIDE

TO

IMPACT,

ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 63-69 (1990). Title II prohibits discrimination in all programs,
activities and services of state and local governments. Id. at 69-70. Title III prohibits
discrimination by privately run places of public accommodation and by public transportation run
by private entities. Id. at 70-74. Title IV covers telecommunications. Id. at 74-75. Title V
contains several miscellaneous provisions. Id. at 75-76..
5.
ABA Commission, Study Finds that Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998) (defining
"final case decisions" as "cases that have gone through the appeals process or have not been
overturned on appeal as of March 31, 1998"). Although there is no comparable information on
the percentage of cases won by employers since mid-1998, there is nothing to suggest that these
numbers have changed significantly.
6.
Id.
7.
Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with PsychiatricDisabilities,Employment
Discriminationand the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 272-73 (2000).
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to be disabled, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving that she fits
within this definition to be covered by the Act.8 To be considered
disabled, an individual must have "a physical or mental impairment"
which "substantially limits one or more of the major life activities."9
Alternatively, an individual will be covered if she has "a record of such
an impairment" or is "regarded as having such an impairment." 10
Even if an individual can establish that she is disabled, the Act only
prohibits discrimination against individuals who are otherwise
qualified for the job. 1 ' An individual is otherwise qualified only if she
can perform the "essential functions" of the job "with or without
reasonable accommodation."'1 2 Finally, the Act requires employers to
provide reasonable accommodation to facilitate job performance by a
disabled individual but only if the reasonable accommodation can be
made without "undue hardship" on the employer.' 3
For many ADA plaintiffs, this framework makes it very
difficult to establish a successful discrimination claim based on an
alleged disability. The ADA's requirement that the individual be
substantially limited in some major life activity is particularly
troublesome to plaintiffs who claim that they are discriminated
against because of a mental disability. 4 Courts generally agree that
activities such as walking, lifting, and performing manual tasks are
major life activities, but these are the sorts of activities that are
affected mainly by physical disabilities.1 5 On the other hand, courts
have been reluctant to regard as major those activities that are
affected by mental disabilities. 16 Evidence of this reluctance is the
current circuit court split over whether the ability to interact with
other people constitutes a major life activity.' 7 Since many mentally
8.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12 112(a) (2000), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against "any individual...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." § 2000e-2. Thus any
person is qualified to bring a claim under the act and the only question is whether that person
was discriminated against because of prohibited factors. On the other the hand, the ADA only
protects those plaintiffs that are disabled, regarded as disabled, or have a record of being
disabled as that term is defined by the Act. § 12102(2). Thus, there is a threshold burden of
proof for an ADA plaintiff that does not exist for a plaintiff under other discrimination laws.
9.
§ 12102(2)(A).
10. § 12102(2)(A)-(B).
11.

§ 12112(a).

12.
13.

§ 12111(8).
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).

14.

SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES 75 (2002).

15.
16.
17.
activity.

Id.
Id.
The First Circuit has held that the ability to get along with others is not a major life
Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (lst Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has
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disabled plaintiffs are not limited in their ability to walk, breathe, or
perform other physical activities, they must show that some other
activity is substantially limited. The activity that many mentally
disabled plaintiffs point to is the ability to interact with others. Social
interaction is often the function most inhibited by mental disability.' 8
Therefore, it is critical for these plaintiffs that the circuit split is
resolved in favor of recognizing the ability to interact with others as a
major life activity.
Even if courts recognize the ability to get along with others as a
major life activity under the ADA, plaintiffs who rely on this activity
will still face a formidable obstacle to coverage because of the
analytical framework of the Act. In addition to proving a substantial
limitation in a major life activity, the plaintiff must show that she is
otherwise qualified for the job. 19
The key inquiry in this
determination is whether the individual can perform the essential
20
elements of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.
Thus, when an employee claims that her ability to interact with others
is substantially limited, an employer can defend against the
discrimination suit by asserting that interacting with others is an
essential element of the job and that the employee is therefore
inherently unqualified. This is likely to be a successful defense in
many cases since the ADA defers to the employer's judgment as to
what functions are essential. 2 1 Indeed, the ability to get along with
others does seem to be an essential element of many jobs in today's
workplace. As a result, the proof that the employee uses to establish
substantial limitation of a major life activity will be used by the
employer to show that the employee is not otherwise qualified for the
job. It is likely that, under this analytical framework, many mentally
disabled plaintiffs will not be covered by the ADA. This Note suggests
that such a result is inconsistent with the Congressional intent in
enacting the ADA.

held that the ability to get along with others is a major life activity. McAlindin v. County of San
Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999). The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits have noted the issue but have not made a determination either way. Cameron v. Cmty.
Aid for Retarded Children. Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63-64 (2d Cir. 2003); Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263
F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001); Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir.
2001); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2001); Amir v. St. Louis Univ.,
184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999).
18. Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity Under the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1143.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2),12112(a) (2000).
20.

§ 12111(8).

21.

See id.
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Part II provides a historical overview of the concept of
disability and outlines the analytical framework of the ADA. Part III
discusses the ADA's framework in the context of mental disabilities,
focusing on the circuit split over the issue of whether the ability to get
along with others is a major life activity. This Note demonstrates
that, regardless of a resolution of the circuit split in the employee's
favor, the analytical framework of the ADA makes it very difficult for
plaintiffs claiming substantial limitation in the ability to get along
with others to prevail in these cases. Part IV argues that this result is
incompatible with the Congressional intent in enacting the ADA and
examines possible solutions that would give deserving mentally
disabled plaintiffs a greater chance for success in ADA cases.
II. THE ADA: ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND FUNCTION
A. The Evolving Definition of "Disability"
22
The concept of disability has changed dramatically over time.
In colonial America, disability correlated with dependency. 23 Disabled
persons were perceived as being unable to care for themselves and
useless to society. 24 Since they were unable to function in society, the
disabled were either hidden away and cared for by family members or
sent to hospitals and asylums to be separated from the rest of
society. 25 This view of disability has been characterized as the
"exclusionary model." 26 One important effect of equating disability
with inability to care for oneself was that many individuals with
serious physical or mental impairments were not considered disabled
if they could care for themselves notwithstanding those
impairments.2 7 Thus, in the employment context, disability was a
with
total
very limited, all-or-nothing concept which was equated
inability to function in the workplace.
In the early part of the twentieth century, advancements in
medical knowledge brought about a new concept of disability. 28 This

22. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscriminationLaw: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2001) (tracing how the concept and interpretation of "disability" has changed
since the ADA's creation).
23. Id. at 94-95.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 96.
27. Id. at 95.
28. Id. at 95-96.

1318

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:4:1313

new "medical model" or "rehabilitation model" rejected the old view
that disabled individuals should be excluded from society. 29 Rather,
the goal was to rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into
mainstream society.30 Still, this new model focused on changing the
disabled person and did not contemplate changing aspects of
mainstream society to allow disabled persons to function. 3 1 Also, the
older exclusionary model continued to apply to people with incurable
disabilities who could not be reintegrated into society. 32 Thus, under
the rehabilitation model, the disabled were separated into two classes:
those who could be rehabilitated and those who could not.33 The focus,
however, remained on figuring out what was wrong with the disabled
person and making her "normal. '34 Although the rehabilitation model
was an improvement over the exclusionary model, the 1960's civil
rights movement, which sought equal treatment for all individuals,
brought about the most important challenges to the prevailing
theories about individuals with disabilities. 35 This movement rejected
the notion that disabled persons could not function in society and
began shifting the focus away from rehabilitation and toward
changing the stereotypes and fears that made it difficult for disabled
individuals to function in society. 36 In response to the civil rights
movement, the government began to address discrimination against
the disabled. The Rehabilitation Act of 197337 was the precursor to
the ADA. Its purpose was "to empower individuals with disabilities to
maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency, independence, and
inclusion and integration into society," and "to ensure that the Federal
Government plays a leadership role in promoting the employment of
individuals with disabilities, especially individuals with significant
disabilities." 38 A 1974 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act provided
the definition of disability that was ultimately incorporated into the
ADA.3 9

29. Id. at 96-97 (citing GARY ALBRECHT, THE DISABILITY BUSINESS: REHABILITATION IN
AMERICA 96 (1992)).

30. Id. at 96.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 96-97.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 97.
36. Id. at 98-100.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2000). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was limited in its
application as it applied only to the federal government (§ 501), federal government contractors
(§ 503), and entities that received federal financial assistance (§ 504).
38. § 701(b)(i)-(2).
39. § 705(9)(B).
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The ADA exemplified society's changing attitude toward
disabled individuals.
It rejected both the exclusionary and the
rehabilitation models of the past and adopted an approach that sought
equal treatment for disabled individuals. 40 When President Bush
signed the ADA, he stated that, "[w]ith today's signing of the
landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, every man, woman and
child with a disability can now pass through once-closed doors, into a
bright new era of equality, independence and freedom." 4 1 The
language of the Act evidenced a new view of what it meant to be
disabled:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals
to participate in, and contribute to, society.42

Perhaps because of the long and varied history of the meaning
of disability, Congress elected to define the term in the ADA. 43 This is
in contrast to other antidiscrimination legislation such as Title VII,
which does not define terms like race, sex, or national origin. 44 One
explanation may be that determining whether a person is disabled is
more difficult than determining a person's race, sex, or national
origin. 45 Including a definition of disability also suggests that not all
people with perceived disabilities are meant to be protected by the Act.
Rather, only those with disabilities severe enough to fit within the
statutory definition deserve protection.
Another option for Congress would have been to use a more
"comprehensive model" to protect all persons with limiting physical or
46
mental conditions from discrimination, regardless of the severity.
The original version of the ADA, introduced in 1988 by the National
Council on the Handicapped, proposed prohibiting discrimination

40. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1145-46.
41. President Signs DisabilitiesAct, 2,000 Cheer Long-Awaited Independence, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, July 27, 1990, at Ni.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000) (emphasis added).
43. See § 12102(2).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
45. Of course, determining a person's race, sex, or national origin is not necessarily obvious
either.
For example, the issues of mixed ancestry and transsexuals can make these
determinations more difficult. However, determining whether someone is disabled has proven to
be a more ambiguous and difficult problem than determining these other characteristics.
46. See Mark Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A
Proposalto Amend the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 251-52 (2002).
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based on any handicap.4 7 This would have greatly expanded the
potential scope of the Act by setting a lower threshold for employees to
receive protection as compared to the existing definition in the
Rehabilitation Act. 48 Some commentators believe that the broader
comprehensive language was not used because of fear in the business
community and the Reagan Administration that broader coverage
would be too burdensome on employers. 49 However, one drafter of the
ADA contends that the decision to define disability rather than using
the comprehensive language was not "a considered, deliberate decision
to narrow the class of covered individuals" but, rather, a "legal
judgment that the existing definition would cover most people with
impairments along the spectrum of physical and mental impairments,
and the political judgment that using any other definition would
unnecessarily slow down passage of the bill."50 Regardless of the
motivation for including the existing definition of disability in the
ADA, the effect has been to provide a substantial hurdle for many
plaintiffs seeking coverage under the Act.
B. Analytical Framework of the ADA
Title I of the ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual." 51 The first step in any ADA case is
for the court to determine whether the plaintiff is disabled. 52 The
ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." 53
Alternatively, an individual will be considered disabled if she has a
"record of such an impairment" or is "regarded as having such an
impairment."54 So, the threshold question is whether an individual
has a mental or physical impairment, a record of such impairment, or
is regarded as having such impairment. If the answer to any of these
questions is yes, then the court must determine whether the
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. If the answer to

47. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 432-33
(1991).
48. 29 U.S.C §§ 701-797 (2000).
49. Rothstein et al., supra note 46, at 250-51.
50. Feldblum, supra note 22, at 129.
51.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).

52.
53.
54.

See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630 (1998).
§ 12 102(2)(a).
§ 12102(2)(b)-(c).
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this question is also yes, then the individual is deemed disabled for
purposes of the ADA.
Since Congress did not define many of the key terms in the
ADA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 55 has
provided guidance through both formal regulations 56 and informal
guidelines.5 7 The formal regulations (regulations), which have been
58
officially promulgated by the EEOC, are entitled to great deference
while the informal guidelines (guidelines or guidance) represent
unofficial statements that are not binding on courts. 59
1. Proving Impairment
Neither the ADA nor the EEOC provides a comprehensive list
of all the diseases or conditions that may qualify as physical or mental
impairments. Thus, in the years since the ADA was passed, courts
have established which physical or mental conditions constitute
impairments. 60 In doing so, courts rely upon the guidelines first set
forth by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that
interpret the Rehabilitation Act of 197361 and were adopted by the
EEOC as regulations applicable to the ADA. 62 Physical or mental
impairment is defined as: (1) Any physiological disorder, or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory, (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
55. Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000). The EEOC has administrative enforcement
responsibilities, which requires an individual complaining of discrimination to timely file a
complaint with the EEOC before any judicial proceeding may commence. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1).
The ADA grants the EEOC the same administrative enforcement responsibilities to the EEOC in
the context of disability discrimination claims. § 12117. The ADA also gives the EEOC the
power to issue regulations to carry out the mandate of ADA. § 12116. These regulations are
found at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2003).
56. See 29 C.F.R pt. 1630.
57. See, e.g. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL (2002)
[hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL].

58. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
courts tend to accord "great deference" to the EEOC's regulations interpreting the ADA).
59. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that
informal guidelines such as the EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines and the Compliance Manual,
although often cited by courts, are not entitled to as much deference as the formal regulations
and are certainly not considered binding).
60. For a substantial, but not comprehensive, list of cases where the court has addressed
different impairments, see GARY S. MARX, 1 DISABILITY LAW COMPLIANCE MANUALapp. 1A
(2002).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (2003).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2003).
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reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
63
illness, and specific learning disabilities.
The term "impairment" has been broadly construed by courts,
making it relatively easy for plaintiffs to establish the existence of
impairment. 64 At trial, most defendants do not even contest the
65
plaintiffs claim of impairment.
2. Defining "Major Life Activity"
If the court determines that a particular condition constitutes
impairment, it must then determine whether the impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities. 66 It is only when
this second question is answered affirmatively that a particular
impairment will rise to the level of a disability under the ADA. 67 The
ADA does not define "major life activity." Since Congress did not
define what constitutes a major life activity, the EEOC has attempted
to guide courts in determining which life activities are major for
purposes of the ADA. The EEOC regulations define major life activity
by providing an exemplary list, including caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing,
learning, and working. 68 With the exception of "learning" and the
ambiguous "working," this list tends to focus on people with physical
disabilities. 69 The EEOC's Compliance Manual expands this list to
include "mental and emotional processes such as thinking,
concentrating, and interacting with others." 70
The Compliance

63. Id.
64. Curtis Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of "MajorLife Activity"
in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 321, 323 (2002).
65. Id. (citing Lisa Eichorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability"Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1475 (1999)).

66. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998).
67. Id.
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2003).
69. Edmonds, supra note 64, at 325-26. Of course, some mentally impaired individuals are
limited in their ability to perform some of these listed activities. However, a large class of
mentally impaired individuals (e.g. those suffering from bipolar disorder or depression) are not
so limited in these activities that they will be successful bringing an ADA claim on this basis. As
discussed below, individuals suffering from the psychiatric disabilities are mostly limited in
social-type activities.
70. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 57, § 902.3(b). Although the Compliance
Manual is given some deference by courts, it is not given as much deference as the actual EEOC
regulations. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997). Thus,
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Manual states that these lists do not provide "an exhaustive list of all
major life activities. '7 1 Instead, the lists represent the types of
72
activities that are major life activities.
Despite this guidance from the EEOC, 73 courts have the
ultimate task of determining which life activities should be considered
"major" for purposes of the ADA. 74 In the leading Supreme Court case,
Bragdon v. Abbott, the plaintiff, who was infected with HIV, claimed
that reproduction was a major life activity. 75 Although Abbott was
infected, she did not manifest serious symptoms when she went to the
defendant's office for a dental examination. 76 Abbott disclosed that
she had HIV, and the dentist informed her that he would not fill
cavities of HIV patients in his office. 77 He offered to fill the cavity at a
hospital, but Abbott would have been required to pay for the use of the
hospital's facilities. 78 She declined and filed suit against the dentist
79
for discrimination in violation of the ADA.
To be protected by the ADA, Abbott had to establish that HIV
was an impairment and that it substantially limited her in some
major life activity.80 The Court easily concluded that HIV was an
impairment.8 1 The Court also found that reproduction is a major life
activity, reasoning that "'[t]he plain meaning of the word 'major'
denotes comparative importance' and 'suggests that the touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its
significance."'8 2 Although Bragdon decisively included reproduction as

the fact the Compliance Manual lists "interacting with others" as a major life activity is not
dispositive as to whether courts will hold that it is.
71. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 57, § 902.3(b).
72. Id. "Specific activities that are similar to the listed activities in terms of their impact on
an individual's functioning, as compared to the average person, also may be major life activities."
Id.
73. Formal regulations are entitled to great deference while informal guidelines are nonbinding on courts. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
74. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (noting that "[n]o
agency... has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable
provisions of the ADA .... Most notably, no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the
term 'disability' (which includes determining what constitutes a major life activity].').
75. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 637-38 (1998).
76. Id. at 628.
77. Id. at 629.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 631.
81. Id. at 632-37 (reproduction was the major life activity that was at issue on appeal so the
court did not consider whether there might be other major life activities which were
substantially limited by the Abbott's HIV).
82. Id. at 638 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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a major life activity, the decision does little to clarify the standard that
83
lower courts should apply to other activities.
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the standard by adding that to qualify as
disabled, a person must be substantially limited in an activity that is
"central to daily life."8 4 Like the guidance provided by the Court in
Bragdon, this language in Toyota fails to set forth a clear standard for
the lower courts to apply in determining whether a particular activity
is major for the purposes of the ADA. Determining whether an
activity is "significant" or "central to daily life" has produced varied
85
results in different lower courts.
3. Defining "Substantially Limits"
Once a plaintiff successfully establishes impairment of a major
life activity, she must prove that the impairment amounts to a
substantial limitation of that activity.8 6 While the ADA does not
define substantial limitation, the EEOC has provided guidance in this
area.
The regulations state that substantially limited means
"[slignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity"
in comparison to the average person.8 7 The EEOC guidelines further
outline three factors that a court should consider in determining
whether a person's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the
duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the
permanent or long term impact, or expected impact, of the
88
impairment.
As with many terms and concepts in the ADA, courts have
struggled to apply the phrase "substantially limits." The Supreme
Court provided some insight in Toyota, where the issue was whether
an employee was substantially limited in her ability to perform
manual tasks.8 9 The Court held that 'substantially' in the phrase
83. Edmonds, supra note 64, at 339 (arguing that the Supreme Court's statement in
Bragdon is "at best, unhelpful. Describing a major life activity as a 'significant' life activity does
little more than replace one synonym for another. If 'significance' is the 'touchstone' for
determining a major life activity, it is a badly chipped touchstone, revealing little truth.").
84. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
85. See infra Part III.A (discussing the circuit split over whether interacting with others is
a major life activity).
86. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).
87. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2003).
88. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j).
89. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192.
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'substantially limits' suggests 'considerable' or 'to a large degree."' 90
The Court added that "[tlhe word 'substantial'. . . clearly precludes
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance
of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities." 91 Additionally, a
plaintiff must provide "evidence that the extent of the limitation
[caused by the impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is
substantial." 92 Thus, courts have held that the existence of a
disability is to be determined on an individual basis in which a
plaintiff must prove that the effect of the impairment was personally,
93
substantially limiting.
Some commentators suggest that the way courts have applied
the "substantially limits" requirement contradicts Congressional
intent by unduly restricting the class of plaintiffs who can establish a
disability under the ADA. One drafter of the ADA suggests that the
Senate Report to the ADA indicates that Congress meant to preclude
only "minor, trivial impairments" or "physical limitations that are not
different from those of the average person." 94 The Senate Report used
the example of "a simple infected finger" to illustrate the kind of minor
impairments that are not substantially limiting. 95 This drafter
contends that the decision to include the "substantially limits"
language in the definition of disability was "not a considered,
96
deliberate decision to narrow the class of covered individuals."
However, legislative history does not indicate whether Congress
intended to adopt a narrow scope of coverage nor does it explain why
Congress adopted the substantial limitation language.9 7 Thus, courts
must define the substantial limitation language, which has resulted in
90. Id. at 196-97.
91. Id. at 197; see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (holding
that a "mere difference" does not amount to a "significant restric[tion]" and therefore does not
satisfy the EEOC's interpretation of "substantially limits").
92. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (quoting Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 567) (emphasis added).
93. Id. "[R]ecently, the courts have tended to hold that the plaintiff is required to introduce
evidence actually comparing his or her limitations to that of the 'average person' as opposed to
relying on the fact finders' general knowledge." DISABILITY LAW COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 1:2
(2002). For exemplary cases, see, for example, Maynard v. Pneumatic Products. Corp., 233 F.3d
1344 (11th Cir. 2000); Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 225 F.3d 620 (6th Cir.
2000); Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc., 221 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000); Santiago Clemente
v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2000). However, comparator evidence may
not be necessary in every case, as at least one court has held, "[c]omparator evidence may
already be established where, for example, caselaw, the regulations, or the EEOC's interpretive
guidance makes clear that plaintiffs condition substantially limits a major life activity as
compared to the average person in the general population." Maynard, 233 F.3d at 1350.
94. Feldblum, supra note 22, at 129.
95. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22 (1988).
96. Feldblum, supra note 22, at 129.
97. Rothstein et al., supra note 46, at 249.
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severe restrictions on the class of plaintiffs who may bring suit under
the ADA.
Another unresolved issue is whether mitigating measures
should be considered in determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity. In Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court held that mitigating measures should
be considered. 9
In Sutton, the plaintiffs were twin sisters with
impaired vision who applied for employment as commercial airline
pilots, but because they did not meet vision requirements, were denied
employment. 99 The sisters filed an ADA discrimination suit. 100 To
meet the definition of disability, they asserted that they were
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. 10' The Court
held that the sisters were not substantially limited by their impaired
vision because they used corrective measures, which gave them 20/20
vision.' 0 2 In doing so, the Court rejected the EEOC's suggestion that
"the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity must be made.., without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."'10 3 The
Court concluded that impairments should be evaluated in their
mitigated state for three reasons. First, the phrase "substantially
limits" is written in the present indicative, which requires that the
"person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability."'10 4 Second, the definition
10 5
of disability requires an evaluation "with respect to an individual."'
If a plaintiff uses mitigating measures, then an individualized inquiry
requires the court to consider such measures rather than speculating
about the degree of impairment absent such measures. 0 6 Finally,
Congress found that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities," and the Court concluded that, if
Congress intended for courts to evaluate plaintiffs in their
07
unmitigated state, this number would be much higher.'
Justice Stevens' dissent in Sutton points out that the Senate
Report, the House of Representatives' Committee Reports, and each of

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476.
See id.
Id. at 481-83.
Id. at 482-84 (citing 29 C.F.R pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)).
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 483 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
Id.
Id. at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
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the three Executive agencies charged with implementing the Act all
indicate that the determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited should be made without regard to mitigating
measures. 10 8 Commentators argue that the Court's decision that
mitigating measures should be considered in determining whether an
individual is disabled will insulate employers from discrimination
liability where impaired individuals control their conditions with
medication and other measures. 10 9 The troubling effect created by
Sutton is that a plaintiff who attempts to limit the impact of her
impairment through mitigating measures will not be considered
disabled under the Act and will not be protected from discriminatory
action by an employer.
Not surprisingly, many plaintiffs asserting mental disability
bring their claims under the ADA's regarded as disabled test, rather
than claiming actual disability. 11° The EEOC regulations provide
three ways that an individual may be regarded as being disabled:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities
only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined [in this section] but is treated by a covered
111
entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Bringing a claim under the theory that a plaintiff is regarded
as disabled rather than actually being disabled makes sense given
that the discrimination faced by many of these plaintiffs is based on
misconceptions and ungrounded fears many people have about mental
disability. 112 In other words, these plaintiffs are not actually disabled
for purposes of the ADA, but, nevertheless, they face workplace
108. Id. at 499-502 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 52 (1990); 29 C.F.R pt.
1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)).
109. See, e.g., STEFAN, supra note 14, at 36-37 ("The court's conclusion that disabilities must
be considered in their mitigated state is devastating to the millions of Americans who control
their conditions of bipolar disorder or depression with medication but are nevertheless afraid
that if their employers discovered this fact they would face discrimination in the workplace. The
U.S. Supreme Court's decisions effectively insulate such discrimination entirely.").
110. Stefan, supra note 7, at 276; see 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(C).
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (2003).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("By
amending the definition of 'handicapped individual' to include not only those who are actually
physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are
substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from actual impairment."); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §1630.2(1) (2003) (explaining that
the purpose of the "regarded as" prong is to cover individuals "rejected from a job because of the
'myths, fears and stereotypes' associated with disabilities").
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discrimination due to some employers' stereotypes about mental
disabilities. Although bringing a claim under the regarded as disabled
test seems like a promising solution for mentally impaired plaintiffs,
courts have narrowly construed this language as requiring evidence
that the plaintiff was regarded as being substantially limited in a
major life activity. 11 3
This interpretation effectively insulates
"discrimination by employers who were simply hostile or
uncomfortable with mental illness, as long as they believed the
14
plaintiff was not limited in one or more major life activities.""
Ultimately, mentally disabled plaintiffs cannot escape the substantial
limitation of a major life activity test even when claiming that an
employer regarded them as disabled. Further, it may be just as
difficult for a plaintiff to establish that her employer regarded her as
substantially limited in a major life activity as it is to establish that
she actually is substantially limited in a major life activity.
Commentators have observed that requiring substantial
limitation of a major life activity, at least as the courts have applied
5
the requirement, undermines the intent and effect of disability law."1
The argument is that people with disabilities are not necessarily
discriminated against because of any real or perceived limitations in
their ability to perform major life activities. 1 6 Rather, they are
discriminated against because others are afraid, ashamed, or hostile
toward them.1 17 This is especially true for people with mental
disabilities, because the "depth of discomfort caused by the revelation
that an individual has a mental illness is not associated with the
perception that the individual is substantially limited in major life
activities."1 18 The inquiry of how well the individual can perform
major life activities is often irrelevant to the discriminatory treatment
they receive from others.1 19 In other words, the discrimination they
113. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 ("[Ilt is necessary that a covered entity entertain
misperceptions about the individual-it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting
impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in
fact, the impairment is not so limiting.").
114. Stefan, supranote 7, at 276.
115. See, e.g., Lisa Eichorn, Major Litigation Activities RegardingMajor Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability"Definition in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1428 (1999) (arguing that defining disabilities in terms of limitations of major life
activities is not only "vague" but "also runs counter to the notions of the disability rights
movement and fails to capture the overall intent of the drafters"); Stefan, supra note 7, at 274
("[R]equiring a person to show that he or she is substantially limited in a major life activity
misses the point of discrimination against people on the basis of psychiatric disability.").
116. STEFAN, supra note 14, at 73.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id.
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face is not rooted in the perception that they are substantially limited
in a major life activity. Therefore, requiring them to prove that they
are substantially limited is not appropriate.
4. Proving "Qualified Individual" Status
To be protected by the ADA, a person must not only be disabled
A "qualified individual with a
but must also be "qualified."1 20
disability" is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires. ' 121 Making this determination requires (1) identifying the
essential functions of the job and (2) determining whether the person
with the disability can perform these functions, with or without
reasonable accommodations. Once again, requiring a plaintiff to show
that she is otherwise qualified for a job, combined with judicial
interpretation of the substantial limitation language, creates a barrier
to recovery because an employee's evidence of her disability can be
used by an employer to show that she is not otherwise qualified for the
job.
The ADA mandates that consideration should be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential. 122 The
ADA also states that, "if an employer has prepared a written
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,
this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions
of the job."' 23 The EEOC regulations define essential functions as the
"fundamental job duties of the employment position" which "[do] not
include the marginal functions of the position."' 2 4 The regulations
provide examples of evidence that should be given considerable weight
125
in determining whether a particular function is essential.

120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
121. § 12111(8).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2003).
125. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). The regulation specifically includes the following types of
evidence:
"(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job
descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii)
The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of
not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective
bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs."

1330

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:4:1313

Courts determine the essential functions of a job on a case-bycase basis. 12 6 The employer has the burden of proving which functions
are essential. 12 7 However, this burden is minor considering that
courts generally defer to the employer in making this
determination. 128 Once the essential functions of a job have been
determined, the court must decide whether the disabled person can
perform those functions. The court makes this determination in light
of any reasonable accommodations that could be provided to the
employee. The ADA places an affirmative duty on employers to
provide reasonable accommodations unless the employer can show
that doing so would place an undue hardship on the employer. 129 The
ADA defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or
adjustment to job requirements, the work environment, or facilities
that would enable a qualified individual with a disability to enjoy an
equal employment opportunity. 130
Requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations for
disabled employees distinguishes the ADA from other employment
antidiscrimination laws, which place no affirmative duties on
employers beyond treating employees equally. 13 1 In the ADA context,
this affirmative duty is necessary because of the unique nature of
disability discrimination. Often, a disabled person is discriminated
against because some unnecessary barrier in the workplace keeps her
from being able to perform the essential functions of her job. 132 If an
employee could perform the essential functions of the job but for these
unnecessary barriers, the ADA requires the employer to make
reasonable accommodations. 133

126. See, e.g., Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
app. § 1630.2(n)) (2003).
127. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Charter Township, 165 F.3d 426, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1999); Monette v.
Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
129. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
130. § 12111(9). The statute states that a reasonable accommodation may include:
"(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities."
Id.
131. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
132. See Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent Developments in the
Legal and PracticalIssues of ReasonableAccommodation, 35 IDAHo L. REV. 227, 228 (1999).
133. Id. at 230.
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Recognizing the burden of reasonable accommodations, the
ADA does not require accommodation if it would cause undue
hardship on the employer. 134 Undue hardship is "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors
set forth." 13 5 Factors that may be considered in determining undue
hardship include the nature and cost of the accommodation, the
financial resources of the entity or facility, and the effect of the
13 6
accommodation on the operation of the facility.

III. APPLYING THE ADA FRAMEWORK TO MENTALLY DISABLED
EMPLOYEES WHO CLAIM SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION IN THEIR ABILITY
TO INTERACT WITH OTHERS.

A. Circuit Split: Is the Ability to Interact with Others a "MajorLife
Activity" under the ADA?
The regulations implementing Title I of the ADA define the
term mental disability to include "any mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 137 For
the most part, courts have recognized diagnoses of most well-known
mental illness such as schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder
as impairments. 138 In fact with regards to most common mental
illnesses, defendants do not contest that they constitute impairments
under the ADA. 139 However, for the purposes of the ADA, just because
a condition is acknowledged as an impairment does not mean that it
will be considered a disability.
To constitute a disability, the
impairment must substantially limit one or more major life
activities.1 40 It is meeting this requirement that presents the first
barrier to recovery for alleged discrimination for those with mental
disabilities under the ADA. Unlike most physical impairments,
mental impairments may not readily appear to limit major life
activities. For example, a paraplegic can identify walking as a life
activity that is substantially limited by her impairment, and since

134. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
135. § 12111(10)(A).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

§ 12111(10)(B)
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2003).
STEFAN, supra note 14, at 47 (citing to exemplary cases).
Id.
§ 12102(2).
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walking is clearly accepted by courts as a major life activity, she
passes the threshold test. Likewise, a blind or deaf individual has no
trouble identifying seeing or hearing as the major life activity that
each of these impairments affects. On the other hand, an individual
with bipolar disorder has the more formidable task of proving how her
impairment limits a major life activity. While more debilitating
mental impairments, such as mental retardation, affect some of the
widely accepted major life activities, other mental impairments such
as schizophrenia, depression, or bipolar disorder primarily affect an
individual's ability to interact with others. 141
Consequently,
interacting with others may be the only major life activity for which
some plaintiffs can establish sufficient proof to meet the substantial
limitation requirement. So, a court's acceptance of the ability to
interact with others as a major life activity will be dispositive in many
ADA cases involving individuals with mental disabilities.
Circuits are currently split on whether the ability to get along
with others should be considered a major life activity for purposes of
the ADA. The First Circuit was the first to squarely address the issue
in Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc. 142 In that case, the plaintiff,
Soileau, had worked for his employer for thirteen years when he was
placed under a new supervisor.1 43 The new supervisor was not
satisfied with Soileau's job performance and, after several warnings
and discussions, issued a final warning and a two-day suspension.' 44
This situation caused great stress for Soileau, who sought treatment
from a psychologist whom he had seen four years earlier during a
depressive episode.1 45 Upon returning to work, Soileau informed his
supervisor of his condition and told him that he was having trouble
interacting with other people, particularly with regard to his
responsibility of facilitating meetings.1 46 The supervisor temporarily
relieved Soileau of his normal responsibilities and limited him to
clerical work. 147 Soileau's psychologist then wrote a letter to the
supervisor asking that Soileau's duties be "restricted so as to avoid
responsibilities which require significant interaction with other
employees" and advising that Soileau "not be ridiculed, provoked, or
141. For a discussion of how mental impairments such as bipolar disorder and depression
affect individuals and their ability to interact with others, see Douglas A. Blair, Employees
Suffering from Bipolar Disorder or ClinicalDepression: Fightingan Uphill Battle for Protection
Under Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347 (1999).
142. 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 13-14.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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startled by or in front of supervisors or other employees."' 148 The
supervisor informed Soileau that he felt these accommodations had
already been met. 149 The following day, Soileau was terminated
because he had failed to correct the problems that led to his
150
suspension.
Soileau sued his employer under the ADA, claiming that he
had a mental impairment which substantially limited him in the
major life activity of interacting with others. 151 The court easily
concluded that Soileau suffered from a mental impairment but
determined that he was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA
because he did not establish a substantial limitation in a major life
activity. 52 The court held that the ability to interact with others
should not be recognized as a major life activity, calling it a "skill to be
prized" but "different in kind from breathing or walking," two
examples of major life activities used in the regulations. 53 The court
felt that the "ability to get along with others" is "remarkably elastic,
perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a definition." 154 The
court further noted that even if it did recognize ability to interact with
others as a major life activity, Soileau's offer of proof would not
establish a substantial limitation in this activity. 155 Working against
Soileau's claim was the court's finding that his alleged disability
"came and went and was triggered by vicissitudes of life which are
normally stressful for ordinary people-losing a girlfriend or being
criticized by a supervisor."' 56 In other words, even if the ability to get
along with others was considered a major life activity, Soileau would
not be covered because he was no different than the average person
who experiences stress and anxiety in work and everyday life.
Other courts have followed the First Circuit in expressing
doubt as to whether the ability to interact with others is a major life
activity under the ADA. 157 For example in Amir v. St. Louis

148. Id.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 13, 15.
152. Id. at 15.
153. Id. Although "interacting with others" is listed as a major life activity in the EEOC
Compliance Manual, it is not listed in the EEOC's regulations. The court in Solieau noted that
while the court had "found reference to the EEOC Compliance Manual to be helpful on occasion,
the manual is hardly binding." Id. at 15 n.2 (citation omitted).
154. Id. at 15.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2001); Amir v. St. Louis
Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999).
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University, the Eighth Circuit stated that it is "questionable whether
[the ability to interact with others] constitutes a major life activity." 158
In Davis v. University of North Carolina,the Fourth Circuit expressed
"some doubt" about the plaintiffs claim that the ability to interact
with others is a major life activity. 159 The Second, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have noted the question, but have not expressed an
inclination either way. 160 Thus, a number of courts either do not allow
ADA plaintiffs to rely on the ability to interact with others as the
major life activity in which they are substantially limited or have not
decided the issue.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in McAlindin v. County of San
Diego, held that the ability to get along with others is a major life
activity. 161 In that case, the plaintiff, McAlindin, suffered from
anxiety and panic disorders. 162 After receiving a promotion at work,
McAlindin requested and was granted leave due to "work stress"
associated with the duties of his new job. 163 He returned to work, but
two years later he again took leave for his "stress-related disability.'1 64
During his extended leave, McAlindin requested that his employer
transfer him to another job, asserting the ADA's requirement of
reasonable accommodations. 165 The employer refused, viewing the
request as an attempt to gain preferential treatment. 166 Upon
returning to work after his second leave, McAlindin subsequently sued
his employer for discrimination in violation of the ADA. 167
McAlindin claimed and the court agreed that the ability to
interact with others is a major life activity. 168 The court reasoned that
"[b]ecause interacting with others is an essential, regular function,
like walking and breathing, it easily falls within the definition of
'major life activity." ' 169 The court directly disputed the First Circuit's
contention that the ability to interact with others was too vague a

158. Amir, 184 F.3d at 1027.
159. Davis, 263 F.3d at 101 n.4.
160. Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63-64 (2d Cir. 2003);
Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2001); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241
F.3d 1248, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2001).
161. 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999).
162. Id. at 1230.
163. Id. at 1231.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. 1231-32.
168. Id. at 1233-34.
169. Id. at 1234.
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concept to be a major life activity. 170 According to the Ninth Circuit,
vagueness is not the statutory test for determining whether an
activity is a "major life activity." 171 Furthermore, the court reasoned
the ability to interact with others is no more vague than the ability to
care for oneself, which has been widely recognized as a major life
activity. 72 This concept is workable because courts can differentiate
between situations where a person is merely "cantankerous" and
situations where the inability to interact with others rises to the level
of substantial limitation. 73 The court will thus rely on the substantial
limitation requirement to prevent plaintiffs with only minor
limitations from being considered disabled under the Act.
Since many plaintiffs suffering from mental impairments are
substantially limited mostly with regard to social interaction, the
ability to interact with others may be the only major life activity that
they can identify for purposes of establishing disability under the
ADA. 174 Thus, the resolution of the circuit split will determine
175
whether these plaintiffs can be considered disabled under the Act.
The Supreme Court's guidance in Bragdon and Toyota seems to
support a resolution in favor of recognizing the ability to interact with
others as a major life activity. 76 In Bragdon, the Court noted that the
is its
"touchstone for determining an activity's inclusion ...
'
77
to be
activity
for
an
stated
that,
the
Court
In Toyota,
significance."'
178
Interacting
major, it must be "of central importance to daily life."'
with others certainly fits both definitions. Since we live in a world
where everyone is "connected," it would be rare to find an individual
who is not required to interact with others, to some degree, in order to
For most people,
work or perform routine everyday tasks. 179
interacting with others is as significant and central to daily life as
judicially recognized major life activities, such as walking and seeing.
If and when the Supreme Court squarely addresses this issue, it will

170. Id. at 1234-35.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1235.
173. Id.
174. See generally Hensel, supra note 18, at 140-43.
175. Commentators have made strong arguments that the ability to interact with others
should be considered a major life activity for the purposes of the Act. See, e.g., Edmonds, supra
note 64; Hensel, supra note 18.
176. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
177. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
178. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
179. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1190.
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most likely hold that the ability to interact with others is a major life
activity for purposes of the ADA.
B. Can an Employee Be "SubstantiallyLimited in the Ability to
Interact with Others" and also "Otherwise Qualified for the Job"?
The analytical framework of the ADA often works to prevent
protection of mentally disabled plaintiffs.
First, plaintiffs must
identify a major life activity that is affected by their impairment, 8 0
and for impairments such as depression and bipolar disorder, the only
impairment they may be able to identify is the ability to interact with
others.' 8 ' Second, assuming that the circuit split is resolved in favor
of recognizing this as a major life activity, proving a substantial
limitation requires an almost complete inability to interact with
others. 8 2 Third, even if plaintiffs meet this burden, an employer may
assert that the ability to interact with others is an essential function
of the job. 8 3 Therefore, evidence showing that employees are
substantially limited in this function may also prove that they are not
qualified for the position. Finally, because plaintiffs must establish an
almost complete inability to interact with others to be considered
disabled, there is likely no reasonable accommodation that would
make such a person qualified. The effect is to largely preclude many
mentally disabled employees from receiving protection under the
ADA.
1. Proving "Substantial Limitation in the Ability to Interact with
Others"
The EEOC Compliance Manual specifically recognizes
interacting with others as a major life activity 8 4 However, the EEOC
noted that an individual is not substantially limited in her ability to
interact with others "just because [she] is irritable or has some trouble

180. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
181. See Blair, supranote 141.
182. See. e.g., Heisler v. Metro. Council, No. CIV.00-2749 RHK/JMM, 2001 WL 1690052, at
*7-8 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2003);
Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1250, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2001); Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc.,
213 F.3d 492 (10th Cir. 2000); Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIV.JFM-99-2637, 2000 WL
1481300, at *3, 5-6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000).
183. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997); Misek-Falkoff v.
Int'l Bus. Machs. Co., 854 F. Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
184. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 57, § 902.3(b); see supra Part II.B (discussing
that the EEOC Compliance Manual is informal guidance, which is not entitled to as much
deference by the courts).
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getting along with a supervisor or coworker."18 5 The EEOC further
explains that an individual would be considered substantially limited
if "her relations with others were characterized on a regular basis by
severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility,
social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary." 18 6
Moreover, "[t]hese limitations must be long-term or potentially longterm, as opposed to temporary, to justify a finding of ADA
18 7
disability."
Absent a statutory definition, courts have set the standard for
substantial limitation in the ability to interact with others in a way
that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment. 8 8
In some courts, in order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff
must demonstrate "potentially life-long impairments that are virtually
incapacitating, coupled with extensive individualized medical
evidence. ' 189 Although the Supreme Court, in Bragdon, noted that the
Act does not require "utter inabilities" in performing major life
activities, some lower courts approach this level of proof in the context
of interaction with others. 190 The First Circuit, in Soileau, held that
interacting with others is not a major life activity but stated that, even
if it were, the plaintiff would not be substantially limited.' 9 1 The court
reasoned that, although he had trouble handling conflicts at work and
could not tolerate crowded places, the plaintiff was not substantially
different from a normal person in stressful situations. 192 The court
also focused on the plaintiffs ability to perform many daily activities
that required interaction with other people, like grocery shopping and
visiting pubs. 193
In finding no substantial limitation, some courts focus on
plaintiffs' ability to get along with other people at least some of the
time. 194 In Steele v. Thiokol Corp., the plaintiff, who was diagnosed
185. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 22 (1997) [herinafter EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.

186. Id.
187. Id.

188. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1178.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Heisler v. Metro. Council, No. CIV.00-2749 RHKIJMM, 2001 WL 1690052, at
*7-8 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001), affd in part, reu'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2003);
Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir. 2001); Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d
492, 498-99 (10th Cir. 2000); Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIV.JFM-99-2637, 2000 WL 1481300,
at *3, 5-6 (D. Md. Sept 28, 2000).
191. Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc.,105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).
192. Id. at 15-16.
193. Id. at 16.
194. Hensel, supra note 18.
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with depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, complained that
he had difficulty getting along with his coworkers. 195 He was often
involved in confrontations with his coworkers and supervisor, which
led to disciplinary action against him. 196 His trouble interacting with
people at work led to a nervous breakdown and a three-and-one-half
week leave of absence. 197 Although the court did not decide whether
the ability to interact with others is a major life activity, it determined
that, even if it were, the plaintiff would not survive summary
198
judgment because he was not substantially limited in this activity.
The court reasoned that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of
establishing a substantial limitation because he did not show that he
had "trouble getting along with people in general" but, rather, only
seemed to have problems with his coworkers.' 99
In Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, the plaintiff, who had
suffered from a major depressive disorder for twenty years, testified
that her impairment caused her to go through periods when she could
20 0
not speak to anyone due to her feelings of sadness and isolation.
The court found that she failed to prove substantial limitation because
she was not wholly unable to interact with others. 20 1 Rather, she
20 2
alleged only that her depression made social interaction difficult.
Essentially the Heisler court equated substantial limitation with total
inability to interact with others. 20 3 Other courts have determined that
evidence of "a single positive relationship is sufficient" to conclude
that a plaintiff is not substantially limited in the ability to interact
20 4
with others.

195. Steele, 241 F.3d at 1250.
196. Id. at 1250-52.
197. Id. at 1252.
198. Id. at 1255.
199. Id.
200. Heisler v. Metro. Council, No. CIV.00-2749 RHKIJMM, 2001 WL 1690052, at *8 (D.
Minn. Dec. 14, 2001), aff'd in part, rev'd on other gounrds, 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2003).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1185; see Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 499 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited because one supervisor
testified that the plaintiff interacted normally with him); Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No.
CLV.JFM-99-2637, 2000 WL 1481300, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000) (finding that plaintiff was not
substantially limited in her ability to interact with others because one co-worker testified that
she had a "good working relationship" with the plaintiff and found working with her "very
pleasurable").
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2. Proving "Otherwise Qualified for the Job"
The requirement that plaintiffs prove almost complete inability
to interact with others in order to establish a substantial limitation
makes it difficult to then convince the court that they are otherwise
qualified for the job. Since the ADA only prohibits discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities, an employer would only
need to show that (1) interacting with others is an essential element of
the job and (2) with or without reasonable accommodation, the
employee cannot perform this essential element. 20 5 Given that the
ADA states that "consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential," it is not
surprising that courts generally agree with employers that interacting
with others is an essential element of most jobs. 20 6 For example, in

Gilday v. Mecosta County, the Sixth Circuit held that "[tihe ability to
get along with customers is necessary for all but the most solitary of
occupations." 207 Further, proving that a plaintiff cannot perform the
essential job function of interacting with others is relatively simple
given that the plaintiff has already had to demonstrate a substantial
limitation in this very function. Proving that a plaintiff is not
otherwise qualified is made even easier in jurisdictions that require
208
almost complete inability to interact with others.
The requirement of reasonable accommodation generally does
not help mentally impaired plaintiffs who assert substantial
limitation in the ability to interact with others to prove that they are
qualified. Recall that the ADA defines "qualified individual with a
disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position."20 9 Theoretically, a plaintiff could argue that,
although she is substantially limited in her ability to interact with
others, which is an essential function of the job, she can perform this
function with reasonable accommodation. However, because many
courts require almost complete inability to interact with others to
establish a substantial limitation, it is hard to imagine a reasonable
accommodation that would make such a person sufficiently able to

205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (2000).
206. § 12111(8).
207. Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Misek-Falkoff v.
Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It is certainly a 'job-related
requirement' that an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get along with co-workers and
supervisors.").
208. See supra Part III.B.1.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
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interact with others to be considered otherwise qualified for the job.
Limiting the individual's interaction with coworkers and supervisors
is likely impractical or even impossible given the modern work
environment where communication and job-interrelatedness are
common. Beyond allowing the person to work from home or in
isolation, there does not seem to be any reasonable accommodation.
Although it is possible that there are some jobs that could be done
from home or without any interaction with others, it is likely that for
the majority of jobs this would not be an option. Therefore, the
reasonable accommodation avenue seems a dead end for the majority
of mentally disabled plaintiffs claiming substantial limitation in their
ability to interact with others.
Consequently, even among courts that accept the ability to
interact with others as a major life activity, the proof required to
establish a substantial limitation is so exacting that employees may
effectively provide employers with the proof needed to establish that
the employee is not otherwise qualified for the job. Employers will
claim that the ability to interact with others is an essential element of
the job which the employee, by proving substantial limitation, has
shown that she cannot perform. Where an employee cannot perform
an essential element of a job given reasonable accommodations, she is
not otherwise qualified and the ADA will provide no protection from
210
discrimination.

IV. Two PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: (1) APPLYING THE "CORRECT"
SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION STANDARD OR (2) BRINGING A REGARDED AS
DISABLED CLAIM
While the judiciary's strict interpretation of substantial
limitation in the ability to interact with others helps eliminate
frivolous claims by individuals who should not be afforded the
protections of disability law, it may go too far in preventing some
deserving mentally impaired plaintiffs from recovering. Two possible
solutions would give deserving plaintiffs a chance for coverage under
the ADA while still protecting employers' interest in ensuring that
frivolous claims are defeated. Both solutions are consistent with the
statutory language of the ADA and, therefore, could be included in the
EEOC regulations and applied by courts without legislative action.
First, courts should adopt a more sensible standard for the substantial
limitation test, whereby a plaintiff would not have to show almost
complete inability to interact with others. Second, plaintiffs should
210. See §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
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bring suit under the regarded as disabled standard rather than the
actually disabled standard. Although the plaintiff must still show
that her employer regarded her as disabled in a major life activity, she
would not have to show actual, substantial limitation, which often
leads to the conclusion that she is not otherwise qualified for the job.
Both proposed solutions operate under the assumption that
courts will accept interaction with others as a major life activity.
Should the Supreme Court decide to resolve the split among the
circuit courts, it should recognize that interacting with others is as
significant and central to daily life as other widely accepted major
activities. 211
A. Regulatory Action to Redefine the Substantial Limitation
Requirement
First, courts should adopt a more sensible standard for the
substantial limitation test. Instead of requiring almost complete
inability to interact with others, courts should follow the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Bragdon that "[t]he Act addresses
212
substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.
With regard to claims based on limitations in the ability to interact
21 3
with others, the lower courts have required more of plaintiffs.
Courts should recognize that an individual who is substantially
limited in her ability to interact with others may still be qualified to
perform a job that requires interaction given reasonable
accommodation. 2 14 Adhering to the concept of substantial limitation
set forth by Supreme Court would allow the ADA to adequately
protect deserving plaintiffs. Unfortunately the Court's language in
Bragdon seems to have been too vague to prevent lower courts from
continuing to set a standard for showing substantial limitation in the
ability to interact with others that is too high. It is apparent that the

211. See supra Part III.A.
212. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
213. See supra Part III.B.1. This may be a result of the doubt lower courts have expressed as
to whether interaction with others should be considered a major life activity in the first place.
See, e.g. Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2001); Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184
F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999).
214. If the court requires almost complete inability to interact with others, then there would
be no accommodation, other than working from home or in isolation, that would work. See supra
Part III.B.2. However, if the courts adopted a more reasonable standard of what it means to be
substantially limited, then there may be some other accommodations that would enable the
individual to perform essential job functions even though she has some difficulty interacting with
others.
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lower courts need more detailed guidance as to what substantially
limits means.
One commentator suggests that the Ninth Circuit set the
appropriate standard in McAlindin when it held that individuals who
demonstrate severe problems interacting with others on a regular
basis, such as "consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal
or failure to communicate when necessary" would meet the
substantial limitation requirement. 215 While this standard appears to
strike a better balance than courts that require almost complete
inability to interact with others, its language, like the Bragdon
language, may also be too vague, thus allowing lower courts to
continue setting too high a burden for the substantial limitation
requirement. Just as the lower courts seem close to requiring the
"utter inabilities" which the Supreme Court rejected, the McAlindin
standard seems subject to the same treatment by the lower courts.
Essentially, these judicial determinations are too vague to effectuate a
clear and uniform standard.
The most appropriate course of action would be for the EEOC
to promulgate regulations that would provide a more comprehensive
statement of what a plaintiff must show to establish a substantial
limitation in her ability to interact with others. The EEOC has
provided some suggestions for courts in its Enforcement Guidance and
its Compliance Manual. However, these suggestions do not bind
courts. 2 16 Since courts afford greater deference to administrative
regulations, which are promulgated according to the agency's formal
217
rule-making procedures, than to informal administrative guidance,
the EEOC should formalize its informal guidance. Currently, EEOC
regulations do not address the issue of whether interaction with
others is a major life activity. The EEOC does recognize interaction
with others as a major life activity in its Compliance Manual, 218 and it
should do so in the regulations as well. This would perhaps solve the
split in the circuits over this threshold issue since the courts would be
more likely to defer to the EEOC. Then, the EEOC should promulgate
regulations setting forth an appropriate standard for showing
substantial limitation in the ability to interact with others. This

215. Hensel, supranote 18, at 1194 (citing McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226,
1235) (9th Cir. 1999); see also EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 185, at 22.
216. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); see also
supra Part II.B.
217. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000); see also Soileau, 105
F.3d at 15 n.2; supra Part II.B.
218. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 57, § 902.3(b).
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would require courts, giving the appropriate deference to the
regulations, to apply a fairer and uniform standard.
In defining substantial limitation in the ability to interact with
others, the proposed EEOC regulations should take their start from
the 1997 Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, which states that:
Some unfriendliness with coworkers or a supervisor would not, standing alone, be
sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in interacting with others. An individual
would be substantially limited, however, if his/her relations with others were
These limitations must be longcharacterized on a regular basis by severe problems ....
to justify a finding of ADA
temporary,
opposed
to
long-term,
as
term or potentially
219
disability.

This language, combined with the examples given in the
Enforcement Guidance, 220 help to define the meaning of substantial
limitation in the context of interacting with others. This language is
In promulgating formal regulations to address
only a start.
interaction with others cases, the EEOC should consider its own
interpretations, found in the Enforcement Guidance and in the
Compliance Manual, as well judicial precedent. The new regulations
should consider all of the possible sources and fashion a
comprehensive statement of what it means to be substantially limited
in the ability to interact with others. Through notice and comment
rulemaking, the EEOC can reconcile the divergent approaches taken
by courts and more fairly address the concerns of employees and
employers. Ultimately, the EEOC must set forth a standard that
rejects "virtual incapacity" and that more appropriately balances the
interests of employers and deserving plaintiffs.
B. BringingMore Claims under the "Regardedas Disabled"Standard
Another solution that would allow more deserving mentally
impaired plaintiffs to bring successful claims for discrimination would
be for these plaintiffs to avoid claiming that they are actually
disabled, and, instead, claim that they are regarded as disabled by
their employers. 221 The ADA allowance of this type of claim is crucial
for plaintiffs who are not substantially limited in any major life
activity yet face discrimination based on an employer's misperception
of them. 222 Many times, employees with mental disabilities do not
need tangible accommodations. Rather, they simply seek to stop the
219.
220.
221.
222.

EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supranote 185, at 22.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
See STEFAN, supranote 14, at 93.
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perception that they are incapable of performing the essential
functions of a job. 223 Thus, it may be more appropriate and more
effective for these plaintiffs to bring a cause of action under the ADA's
"regarded as" standard rather than attempt to prove actual disability.
Although the regarded as disabled standard recognizes that
some discrimination is grounded in an employer's perception of mental
disability, bringing a successful claim under this standard remains
difficult.
The EEOC and courts have interpreted "regarded as
disabled" as requiring a plaintiff to show that her employer regarded
her as substantially limited in some major life activity. 224 It may be
just as difficult to prove that an employer thought that an employee
was substantially limited in a major life activity as it is to prove that
the employee was actually and substantially limited in a major life
225
activity.
Despite this difficulty, plaintiffs may still ultimately have more
success claiming that they are regarded as disabled rather than
actually disabled because the regarded as claim avoids the problem of
having to show substantial limitation in the ability to interact with
others while at the same time proving qualification for the job. Under
a claim of actual disability, the employer can show that the plaintiff is
not otherwise qualified for the job by using the plaintiffs proof of
substantial limitation in the ability to interact with others.226
However, under a "regarded as disabled" claim, the plaintiff is not
required to put on proof of inability to interact with others; she must
show only that the employer perceived her as unable to interact with
others. 227 Thus, the proof that the plaintiff puts forward will not
undermine the requirement that she be otherwise qualified.
Even plaintiffs whose mental disabilities actually do affect
their ability to interact with others should consider bringing their
claims under the regarded as disabled standard. Although ideally
these plaintiffs would rather employers and courts recognize that they
can be both substantially limited in their ability to interact with
others and qualified for the job given reasonable accommodations, as a
practical matter, it is difficult to win this argument given the current
judicial application of the ADA framework. As long as courts continue

223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) ("[I]t is necessary
that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual-it must believe either that
one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a
substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.").
225. See supra Part II.B.3.
226. See supra Part III.B.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
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to require a showing of virtual incapacity to interact with others to
establish a substantial limitation, plaintiffs will have difficulty
bringing a claim under the actual disability standard. Ultimately,
courts should move away from this virtual incapacity requirement
toward a more balanced standard for showing substantial limitation.
For now, many plaintiffs can increase the likelihood of a successful
claim by arguing not that they are disabled yet qualified, but rather
that they are regarded as disabled by their employers. Under both
proposals, the plaintiff must not only show that she fits within a
protected class of the ADA but must also show that she was actually
discriminated against by her employer because of an actual or
a
perceived disability. 228 Thus, lowering the threshold for establishing229
disability would not excessively increase employer liability.
Lowering the threshold will, however, allow more plaintiffs to survive
summary judgment and put on their case of discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current judicial application of the ADA to mentally disabled
employees who have difficulty interacting with others makes it nearly
impossible for some deserving plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment. The first obstacle these plaintiffs face is convincing the
court that interacting with others is a major life activity for the
purposes of the ADA. 230 The circuits are currently split on this
issue. 231 If and when the Supreme Court decides the question, it
should determine that interacting with other is indeed a major life
activity. The Court's language in Bragdon, that the test for whether
something is a major life activity is its "significance,"' 232 and Toyota,
that the determination is whether it is of "central importance to daily
life," 233 supports the conclusion that interacting with others should be
included. Even if courts recognize this major life activity, plaintiffs
face a second obstacle. In proving that they are disabled due to a
substantial limitation in their ability to interact with others, these
plaintiffs necessarily present themselves as being unqualified for most
jobs. This obstacle exists because some courts seem to require a
''virtual incapacity" to interact with others in order to be considered

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See § 12112(a).
See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).
See supra Part III.A.
Id.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
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substantially limited. 234 If plaintiffs satisfy this burden, employers
can then argue that the ability to interact with others is an essential
function of the job that the plaintiff desires and that since the plaintiff
is so limited in this function, she is inherently not qualified for the
position.
To overcome the second obstacle, courts should relax the
substantial limitation standard in a way that is more consistent with
Congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent.
The EEOC
should promulgate formal regulations that set an appropriate
standard for showing a substantial limitation in the ability to interact
with others. The EEOC has already provided guidance in this
regard, 23 5 but a regulation that requires judicial deference is needed.
Adjusting the substantial limitation standard will allow more
plaintiffs to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing disability.
Lowering the burden of proof for plaintiffs will not excessively extend
employer liability because the ADA still requires that the plaintiff
actually prove that the employer discriminated on the basis of a
disability or perceived disability. 236
Alternatively, some plaintiffs should consider utilizing the
regarded as standard of the ADA rather than trying to establish
actual disability. This approach is especially appropriate in the
context of mental disability where discrimination is often rooted in
misperceptions about workplace capabilities. 237 Since a plaintiff must
show that the employer merely regarded her as substantially limited
in her ability to interact with others, rather than proving actual
substantial limitation, the plaintiff avoids the problem of
unintentionally proving that she is not qualified for the job. 238 For
this reason, even if a plaintiff is actually limited in her ability to
interact with others, she should consider bringing a claim under the
regarded as disabled standard. Although she would like the court to
recognize that she can be both substantially limited in her ability to

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra Part III.B.1.
See, e.g., supratext accompanying note 217.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
See STEFAN, supra note 14, at 93.
§ 12102(2); see supra Part V.B.
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interact with others and also qualified for the job, until the court
changes its substantial limitation standard, a claim brought under the
regarded as disabled standard is more likely to succeed.
Mark DeLoach*
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